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RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1725
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7545

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TAGS: [ETTC](#) [MARR](#) [MCAP](#) [MOPS](#) [PARM](#) [PINR](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [IN](#) [SY](#)
SUBJECT: INDIA TO INVESTIGATE DETONATOR SALES TO SYRIA,
UPDATE EXPORT CONTROLS CONSISTENT WITH WASSENAAR

REF: A. SECSTATE 4489
[1](#)B. SECSTATE 4690

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)

[1](#)1. (S) Ministry of External Affairs Under Secretary for Disarmament and International Security Affairs (DISA) Mr. Vipul told Poloff January 23 that India took very seriously ref A information about the sale by two Indian firms of Wassenaar-controlled detonators to Syria, and said India would investigate the matter. Speaking informally and without guidance, Vipul shared that Indian private sector manufacturers generally produced explosives appropriate only for civil applications (like mining), but that explosives with military applications were "normally" produced by public sector entities controlled by the government, which he referred to as Indian Ordinance Factories. He was not acquainted with the two specific firms indicated in ref A, but said he hoped an internal investigation could answer the questions about the circumstances of any such transfer.

[1](#)2. (C) Vipul reaffirmed that although India was not a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, it had every intention to adhere to its guidelines, and indicated that he understood the implications of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). Vipul shared that India shared the conclusions of the October 2007 paper outlining the U.S. understanding of the remaining differences between India's SCOMET list and the Wassenaar control list, adding that India did not see a need to respond formally with another letter or a counter-draft. Rather, he shared that India was in the process of holding inter-agency meetings to follow up on updating its SCOMET 'List 6' (on munitions) consistent with our shared understanding of the Wassenaar requirements. He elaborated, "I know you have heard all this before, that we are working on it, but I can assure you the process to work out an inter-agency consensus is well underway." He added that a meeting had been scheduled for December 2008, but hinted it was postponed following the Mumbai attacks, and would be held "very soon." (Note: Counter-terrorism also falls under DISA's purview at the Ministry of External Affairs.)

[1](#)3. (C) Vipul also read with interest ref B nonpaper on the results of the 2008 plenary of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in Canberra. He said India welcomed the MTCR read-out and would welcome, in particular, updates on Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) proceedings. He said he would have to await formal guidance to respond to the India-specific points, but reaffirmed in principle India's interest in further export control talks with the U.S.

WHITE